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Confessions Of Judgment In Illinois: The Need For
Change Persists
INTRODUCTION

The Illinois procedure' by which judgments may be confessed
dates back to early common law.' Underlying the confession process
is the debtor's advance consent to in personam jurisdiction, and,
more importantly, his relinquishment of due process rights to notice
and a hearing before an adverse judgment may be entered.' In addition, the Illinois confession of judgment statute sanctions the common law device known as a warrant of attorney, which is a written
authorization by the debtor empowering any attorney to appear in
court and confess judgment on the debtor's behalf.' By virtue of this
authority, the creditor can, and usually does, appoint the attorney
who will make the confession.5
Unlike most other states,' Illinois places virtually7 no limitations
on the use of the above provisions. Nor are the concessions which
the creditor may demand from the debtor restricted to these three
major components. Confession notes' typically demand the waiver
1. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 50(3) (1977). See note 12 infra.
2. French v. Wilier, 126 Ill. 611, 617, 18 N.E. 811, 814 (1888). See generally Comment,
Confession of Judgment Under a Warrant of Attorney, 6 AKRON L. REv. 63 (1973) for a
synopsis of the common law history of confessions of judgment. The confession procedure was
originally engendered as a means by which a debtor could exchange a written confession for
the privilege of extending his debt. If the debtor subsequently failed to meet his obligations,
the creditor could have the judgment confessed and executed without delay. Comment,
Confession of Judgment in California, 8 PAc. L.J. 99, 99-100 (1977) citing W. TDD, 1 TIDD'S
PRAMcTCE 559 (4th Amer. Ed. 1856).
3. Comment, Confession of Judgment in California, 8 PAC. L.J. 99, 100 (1977).
4. Comment, Confessions of Judgment, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 524, 526 (1954).
5. Comment, Confession of Judgment in California,8 PAc. L.J. 99, 100 (1977); Comment,
Confession of Judgment Under a Warrant of Attorney, 6 AKRON L. REv. 63, 64 (1973).
6. Regulation usually occurs in the area of small loans and consumer sales, as exemplified
by the statutes of California, Connecticut, Michigan, New York and New Jersey. See Comment, Confession of Judgment Under a Warrant of Attorney, 6 AKRON L. REv. 63, 76 (1973)
for a survey of the position taken by each state in respect to limitations placed on the use of
warrants of attorney.
7. See text accompanying note 13 infra.
8. The term "confession note", as used in this Note, refers to any instrument which
incorporates a confession of judgment clause. As this Note deals with Illinois law, such clauses
will be presumed to contain a warrant of attorney as well as advance consent to jurisdiction
and a waiver of due process rights. Deviations from this definition, where necessary to examine confession procedures in other jurisdictions, will be noted.
Much confusion has been caused by the intertwining of the terms "cognovit," "confession
of judgment (confession)" and "warrant of attorney". The ambiguity dates back to early
common law. At that time, if the debtor executed his confession after having received a
summons but prior to entering his plea the procedure was known as a cognovit actionem. If
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of other rights, including the right to a jury trial, the right of appeal
and the release of all errors in the confession proceedings? Although
Illinois does provide a method for attacking confessed judgments
subsequent to their entry, 0 the ease with which debtors are permitted to waive their rights should not continue to be sanctioned." This
the debtor's confession was executed subsequent to his plea it was a cognovit actionem relicta
verificatione, and contained a promise on the part of the debtor to withdraw his plea. 41 U.
CN. L. Rav. 741, 743 (1972). The alternative method of providing for confessed judgments at
common law was the warrant of attorney, used in the absence of service of process. Id. See
notes 3 through 5 supra and accompanying text. The warrant was usually a separate instrument executed at the same time as the confession note. Note, Cognovit Notes in Indiana, 21
NOTRE DAME LAw. 187, 187 (1946).
The term cognovit, however, as the term is used today is really an outgrowth of the warrant
of attorney and not of the cognovit actionems. Courts and commentators alike interchange
the terms "cognovit," "confession of judgment (or confession)" and "warrant of attorney".
As used in this Note, the terms "confession" and "confession of judgment" are employed to
cover warrants of attorney, advance consent to jurisdiction and waiver of due process rights.
"Confessed judgment" refers only to judgments entered pursuant to a confession clause where
there has been no service of process.
9. The following confession clause is indicative of the concessions made by a debtor in
signing a confession note:
Tenant. . . irrevocably authorizes any attorney of any court of record in any state
of the United States from time to time to appear for tenant . . . in such court, to
waive process service and trial by jury, to confess judgment in favor of owner for
any rent and interest due hereunder . . . and for owner's costs and reasonable
attorney's fees, to waive and release all errors in such proceedings and all right of
appeal and to consent to an immediate execution upon the judgment.
This clause appears in pre-printed lease forms in widespread use in the Chicago area. See
Comment, An Attack on Confession of Judgment Clauses in Residential Leases Through
Section 2-302 of the UCC, 50 CHI-KENr L. Rav. 482 (1973).
Confession provisions are found in all types of instruments of indebtedness such as loan
forms, leases of real and personal property, installment sales contracts, bailment leases and
bonds. Comment, Confessions of Judgment, U. Pa. L. Rev. 524, 524 n.4, 528 n.27 (1954). For
the sake of convenience, this Note uses the terms "debtor-creditor" rather than "ownertenant," "buyer-seller" etc. to describe the parties involved in confessions of judgment.
10. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 110A, § 276 (1977). See note 28 infra.
11. The pernicious effect of the Illinois procedure is not limited to Illinois residents. Under
the U.S. Constitution, states which have attempted to protect their own citizens by restricting or prohibiting the execution of confession notes within their borders must nevertheless
enforce a valid Illinois confession judgment if sued upon in that foreign jurisdiction. U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
The distaste of other jurisdictions for enforcing Illinois confessed judgments is often noted
in their decisions. See, e.g., Bell. v. Staren & Co., 259 Ark. 506, 534 S.W.2d 238 (1976).
Frequently courts look for minor technicalities on which to base a refusal to accord such
judgments full faith and credit. See Nardi v. Poinsatte, 46 F.2d 347 (N.D. Ind. 1931), in which
the court refused to enforce an Illinois judgment partly because the attorney Freedman, who
confessed judgment on behalf of the defendants, was not authorized to act under the terms
of the confession. Although Freedman was the attorney in fact, the court noted that the
authorization in the confession ran only to an attorney of a court of record and nothing in
the proceedings indicated that Freedman qualified as such. Id. at 348.
In First Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. White, 220 Mo. 717, 120 S.W. 36 (1909) the Missouri
Supreme Court refused to enforce an Illinois confessed judgment because it violated the
public policy of the state. But see State v. Shain, 347 Mo. 928, 149 S.W.2d 812 (1941) where
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Note examines the state of present confession law and the inequities
which that law countenances. It concludes with proposals to redress
the unfairness inherent in the confession process.
THE ILLINOIS STATUTE AT WoRK" AN OVERVIEW

The Illinois confession of judgment statute permits a debtor to
confess judgment on his own behalf or through an authorized attorney, without process." The only restriction placed on this practice
is a jurisdictional one. The confession must be made in the county
where the obligation was executed, where any debtor resides, or13
where either real or personal property of the debtor is located.
Failure to comply with this requirement renders the confessed judgment void despite a provision to the contrary included in the confession note."
When a confession clause is contained in an instrument evidencing indebtedness, the debtor becomes bound by the clause prior to
default.' 5 Entry of a confessed judgment may or may not be predia later Missouri Supreme Court held that such a judgment must be given full faith and credit.
Compare Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1969) in which the New York court refused to enforce a confessed judgment rendered in
Pennsylvania. The court declared that the Pennsylvania confession procedure was not,
strictly speaking, a judicial proceeding and therefore held that the judgment need not be
accorded full faith and credit. In addition, the court held that as the confession clause
contained a warrant of attorney and authorized judgment to be confessed anywhere in the
world without notice, due process was violated and the rendering court was thus deprived of
jurisdiction. As at least one court has noted, although Ezrine may have reached a desirable
conclusion, the opinion was more emotional than well reasoned. Osmond v. Spence, 327 F.
Supp. 1349, 1358 (D. Del. 1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 971 (1972).
Prior to 1972, the only two United States Supreme Court decisions which dealt with confessions of judgment involved the issue of full faith and credit. Nat'l Exchange Bank v. Wiley,
195 U.S. 257 (1904); Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890).
12. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 50(3) (1977).
Any person for a debt bona fide due may confess judgment by himself or attorney
duly authorized, without process. The application to confess judgment shall be
made in the county in which the note or obligation was executed or in the county
in which one or more of the defendants reside or in any county in which is located
any property, real or personal, owned by any one or more of the defendants. A
judgment entered by any court in any county other than those herein specified has
no force or validity, anything in the power to confess to the contrary notwithstanding.
13. Id. However, this restriction is not always narrowly construed. See, e.g., Style Builders, Inc. v. Fuernstahl, 21 111.App. 3d 898, 315 N.E.2d 923 (1974), where judgment confessed
in Cook County, Illinois, against a Du Page County resident was upheld. The Cook County
court had jurisdiction since the defendant's place of employment was located within that
county and the wages he received constituted a property right sufficient to accord jurisdiction
under the statute.
14. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 50(3) (1977). See note 12 supra.
15. See Investors Commercial Corp. v. Metcalf, 13 111. App. 2d 99, 102-03, 140 N.E.2d 924,
926 (1957).
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cated upon the debtor's nonperformance. If so predicated, judgment
may be entered immediately upon default. If the confession is not
so conditioned, judgment may be entered as soon as the debt instrument is signed," replacing the need for collateral" in some transactions. Upon default, execution on the judgment may ensue without
delay. 18
Illinois courts have consistently emphasized that the power to
confess a judgment must be clearly given and strictly construed.19
Accordingly, confessed judgments have been voided where the warrant of attorney authorized a specific person to confess judgment
and instead judgment was confessed by a third party.2 They have
also been voided where the debtor did not sign the instrument containing the confession clause, where the amount due could not be
determined from the face of the confession note, 2 and where joint
23
obligees were not joined as necessary parties to the action.
Despite the courts' avowed restrictive view of confession clauses,
the debtor is in an unenviable position when the creditor applies to
have a confessed judgment entered. Having authorized any attorney
to confess judgment on his behalf, the debtor leaves the selection of
the attorney to the discretion of the creditor. 4 Since the debtor has
already relinquished his right to contest entry of the judgment, the
16. See Thomas v. Mueller, 106 Ill. 36 (1883); DeGarmo v. Aldeco, Inc., 13 Ill. App. 3d
403, 300 N.E.2d 270 (1972); Ives v. May, 5 Ill. App. 3d 193, 282 N.E.2d 193 (1972).
17. See Note, Cognovit Judgments: Some Constitutional Considerations, 70 COLUM. L.
REv. 1118, 1130 (1970).
18. See Comment, Confessions of Judgment in California, 8 PAC. L.J. 99, 101 (1977).
19. Nardi v. Poinsatte, 46 F.2d 347, 348 (N.D. Ind. 1931); Keith v. Kellogg, 97 Ill. 147,
151 (1880); O'Toole v. Helio Products, Inc., 17 Ill. App. 2d 82, 149 N.E.2d 795 (1958). Cf.
Edward Bershad Co. v. Babe's Bar, Inc., Pa. _ _
386 A.2d 50, 52 (1978), where
the Pennsylvania court suggested that strict construction of confession clauses may be constitutionally required. The Pennsylvania confession procedure is similar to the one found in
Illinois.
20. Broadway Management Corp. v. Briggs, 30 Ill. App. 3d 403, 332 N.E.2d 131 (1975);
Shatz v. Dunn, 18 Ill. App. 3d 390, 309 N.E.2d 702 (1974).
21. These cases typically involve leases. See, e.g., Weber v. Powers, 213 Ill. 370, 72 N.E.
1070 (1904), holding that judgment could not be confessed against a hold-over tenant where
the lease containing the confession clause had expired; March v. Cacioppo, 37 Ill. App. 2d
235, 185 N.E.2d 397 (1962) where the defendant had confessed judgment on the basis of an
unsigned lease; and Wolf v. Gaines, 33 Ill. App. 2d 428, 179 N.E.2d 466 (1961) where the court
refused to uphold a judgment confessed against Gaines who had signed a writing agreeing to
carry out the terms of a lease which contained a confession clause, but had not signed the
lease itself.
22. Grundy County Nat'l Bank v. Westfall, 49 Ill.
2d 498, 275 N.E.2d 374 (1971).
23. Kanelos v. Tzamalis, 73 Ill. App. 2d 283, 219 N.E.2d 755 (1966).
24. Long v. Coffman, 230 Ill. App. 527, 532 (1923). Often, the attorney confessing judgment is a member of the same firm as the creditor's counsel. Gecht v. Suson, 3 Ill. App. 3d
183, 188, 278 N.E.2d 193, 196 (1971), citing Blanck v. Medly, 63 Ill. App. 211 (1896). Gecht
noted that the attorney's fees are computed according to a formula set forth in a circuit court
rule, thus preventing the entry of an arbitrary fee. Id.
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chosen attorney has no duty to represent the interests of the
debtor.0 Concomitant with forfeiture of the debtor's right to representation by counsel of his choice is the release of all errors which
may occur incident to the entry of a confessed judgment."5 However,
the waiver of error provision indigenous to confession clauses is
somewhat limited, in that it is void when applied to defects of a
27
material nature.
A judgment entered by confession may be attacked in conformity
with the method provided by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 276.28 In
making a motion to open the judgment, it is incumbent upon the
debtor to submit affidavits and a proposed answer which will convince the court that the debtor has a prima facie defense on the
merits.29 If the debtor succeeds in meeting this burden, the motion
25. The use of warrants of attorney may be a questionable practice under the ethical
considerations of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility. See
generally ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs No. 7 which deals with the duty of an attorney
to represent his client zealously.
26. First Nat'l Bank of New Paris v. Royer, 273 Ill. App. 158, 160 (1933).
27. Blake v. State Bank of Freeport, 178 Ill. 182, 184, 52 N.E. 957, 958 (1899); Kanelos v.
Tzamalis, 73 111. App. 2d 283, 286, 219 N.E.2d 755, 757 (1966) citing First Nat'l Bank of New
Paris v. Royer, 273 Ill. App. 2d 158, 160 (1933). Material defects include the lack of jurisdiction and the absence of a validly executed warrant of attorney.
28. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 276 (1977). This supreme court rule provides:
A motion to open a judgment by confession shall be supported by affidavit...
and shall be accompanied by a verified answer which defendant proposes to file. If
the motion and affidavit disclose a prima facie defense on the merits to the whole
or a part of the plaintiff's demand, the court shall set the motion for hearing. The
plaintiff may file counteraffidavits. If, at the hearing upon the motion, it appears
that the defendant has a defense on the merits to the whole or a part of the
plaintiff's demand and that he has been diligent in presenting his motion to open
the judgment, the court shall sustain the motion either as to the whole of the
judgment or as to any part thereof as to which a good defense has been shown, and
the case shall thereafter proceed to trial upon the complaint, answer, and any
further pleadings which are required or permitted. If an order is entered opening
the judgment, defendant may assert any counterclaim, and plaintiff may amend
his complaint so as to assert any other claims, including claims which have accrued
subsequent to the entry of the original judgment. The issues of the case shall be
tried by the court without a jury unless the defendant or the plaintiff demands a
jury and pays the proper fee . . . to the clerk at the time of the entry of the order
opening the judgment. The original judgment stands as security, and all further
proceedings thereon are stayed until the further order of the court, but if the defense
is to a part only of the original judgment, the judgment stands as to the balance
and execution may issue thereon. If a defendant files a motion supported by affidavit which does not disclose a defense to the merits but discloses a counterclaim
against the plaintiff, and defendant has been diligent in presenting his motion, the
trial court may permit the filing of the counterclaim and to the extent justice
requires may stay proceedings on the judgment by confession until the counterclaim is disposed of.
29. The affidavits will be deemed insufficient to support a motion to open a judgment if
they are "general, conclusory and incomplete." Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Slymon, 56 I1.
App. 3d 581, 583, 371 N.E.2d 1187, 1188 (1977).
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is set for hearing and the creditor may submit counteraffidavits in
support of his position."e
The hearing contemplated by the Supreme Court Rule is confined
to the motion and its supporting affidavits. No inquiry can be made
into the facts of the case and the debtor's allegations regarding a
meritorious defense must be accepted as true." If at the hearing the
court finds that a meritorious defense has been manifested32 and
that the debtor has shown due diligence in presenting his motion,3
the court must grant the motion to open the judgment and proceed
to trial. 3' The confessed judgment is not vacated or set aside but
merely opened in order to allow each party to argue the merits of
his case. 5 Unless and until the debtor is able to prevail on the merits
at a trial, the original judgment remains in force and stands as
30. See note 28 supra.
31. Lewis v. Palmer, 20 Ill. App. 3d 237, 239, 313 N.E.2d 656, 658-59 (1974); Mierlak v.
Pizzo, 9 Ill. App. 3d 504, 292 N.E.2d 475 (1972); Nat'l Boulevard Bank of Chicago v. Corydon
Travel Bureau, 95 Ill. App. 2d 281, 285, 238 N.E.2d 81, 83-84 (1968).
In scrutinizing the motion and affidavits, the court must ascertain whether the facts alleged
would be admissible into evidence were the case to proceed to a trial on the merits. 20 Ill.
App. 3d at 240, 313 N.E.2d at 659. Admissibility problems may present real stumbling blocks
for a defendant. See Estate of Segur v. Jacoby, 5 111. App. 3d 459, 283 N.E.2d 76 (1972) where
the defendant was incompetent to testify under the Illinois Dead Man's Act and therefore
was unable to present sufficient evidence to support his affidavit; Burkett v. Finger Lake
Development Corp., 32 I1. App. 3d 396, 336 N.E.2d 628 (1975) where the court noted that
mere denial of the authenticity of a signature on a confession note would not suffice to raise
a meritorious defense due to the presumption of genuineness established by § 3-307 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 402, 336 N.E.2d at 633.
32. "A defense on the merits in this type of case has long been held to be one which
depends on the inherent justice of the defendant's contention as shown by substantial facts."
Turner v. Smiley, 8 111. App. 3d 388, 390, 291 N.E.2d 27, 29 (1972). See, e.g., Kuh v. Williams,
13 Ill. App. 3d 588, 301 N.E.2d 151 (1973) (lack of consideration and fraud); Marcus v. Wilson,
16 Ill. App. 3d 724, 306 N.E.2d 554 (1973) (fraud); First Commercial Bank v. Point of View,
Inc., 9 Ill. App. 3d 515, 292 N.E.2d 482 (1973) (expiration of lease containing the confession).
But cf. Sears Bank & Trust Co. v. Scott, 29 IIl. App. 3d 1001, 331 N.E.2d 607 (1975) where
the court held that a challenge as to the sum owed would not be sufficient to support the
motion to open since the sum was within the amount of the obligation set forth in the
instrument.
33. Bua, Motion Practicein the Circuit Court of Cook County-A Cursory Outline, 54
Cm. BAR RECORD 231 (1973). See Kuh v. Williams, 13 Ill. App. 3d 588, 592, 301 N.E.2d 151,
153 (1973) where the court stated that the presence of a meritorious defense outweighs the
presence or absence of due diligence.
Motions to open confessed judgments should be construed in a liberal, equitable manner.
Bayles v. Bennett, 22 111.App. 3d 144, 146, 316 N.E.2d 792, 793 (1974). As one commentator
has noted, the ease with which confessed judgments may be opened does not really indicate
that the procedure involved is a fair one. To the contrary, "it indicates that trial court judges
feel that the system is inherently subject to abuse." Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored
Problem of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. Cm. L. Rav. 111, 123 n.71 (1961).
34. Lewis v. Palmer, 20 Ill. App. 3d 237, 240, 313 N.E.2d 656, 659 (1974).
35. Mangiamele v. Terrana, 42 Ill. App. 3d 305, 307, 355 N.E.2d 765, 767 (1976), citing
Marengo State Bank v. Meyers, 89 Ill. App. 2d 421, 435, 232 N.E.2d 75, 82 (1967).
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security.3 However, execution on the judgment is stayed pending
37
the outcome of the litigation.
CONFESSIONS AND

DUE PROCESS

Due process, as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution,38 is an elusive, almost chimerical concept. It embodies
the right of every person to receive notice of proceedings instituted
against him and to have an opportunity to be heard on his own
behalf. Only then may he be deprived of life, liberty or property by
adjudication." However, a defendant may waive these due process
rights.40 Since the waiver of due process is the essence of a confession
clause,4 due process rights are inextricably linked with judgments
42
by confession in Illinois.
Due process challenges to confession clauses have recurred on a
regular basis.4 3 However, both the United States Supreme Court
and the Illinois Supreme Court have consistently refused to declare
such provisions unconstitutional per se.11 These courts have reasoned that confessions of judgment cannot be declared facially invalid because due process rights of notice and hearing may be effectively waived in civil cases. 5
Rather than providing definitive guidelines by which to determine the constitutionality of confession clauses, the recent United
States Supreme Court decision of D. H. Overmyer Company v.
Frick Company" raised more questions than it answered.47 In up36. Marengo State Bank v. Meyers, 89 Ill. App. 2d 421, 435, 232 N.E.2d 75, 82 (1967).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 276 (1977). See note 28 supra.
37. See note 28 supra.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
39. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337, 339-40 (1969); Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272, 1275 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
40. Isbell v. County of Sonoma, __
Cal. 3d ____
577 P.2d 188, 189, 145 Cal. Rptr.
368, 369 (1978).
41. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
42. The Illinois confession statute specifically sanctions a waiver of due process rights. See
note 12 supra.
43. See Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 27 Ill. App. 3d 225, 326 N.E.2d 542 (1975); Star
Finance Corp. v. McGee, 27 Ill. App. 3d 421, 326 N.E.2d 518 (1975). Similar constitutional
challenges to the unrestrained use of confession clauses continue in Pennsylvania as well. See
Chittester v. LC-DC-F Employees G.E. Fed. Credit Union, 384 F. Supp. 475, 476 (W.D. Pa.
1974); North Penn Consumer Discount Co. v. Shultz, - Pa. Super. Ct .....
378 A.
2d 1275, 1276 (1977).
44. D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 186 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S.
191, 200 (1972); First Nat'l Bank in DeKalb v. Keisman, 47 Ill. 2d 364, 366, 265 N.E.2d 662,
663 (1970).
45. D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972).
46. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
47. See Piercy v. Heyison, 565 F.2d 854, 860 (3d Cir. 1977).
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holding the constitutionality of the confessed judgment in
Overmyer, the court stressed that its holding would not be controlling if applied in a factually different context. 8 Overmyer Co., a
large corporation, entered into a contract with the respondent, Frick
Co., for the manufacture and installation of a refrigeration system.
Subsequently Overmyer fell behind in the payments due under the
contract. After considerable negotiation, the parties agreed to a new
payment plan and Overmyer executed an installment note. No confession clause was contained in this note. Thereafter, Overmyer
requested additional time to make the installment payments. Following further negotiation, Overmyer signed a new note which,
among other provisions, included a confession of judgment clause."
One year later Overmyer ceased making payments under the note,
and a month after that Frick caused judgment to be confessed
against Overmyer in an Ohio court. 0
Overmyer argued that it is "unconstitutional to waive in advance
the right to present a defense. . . . "5 In rejecting this contention,
48. 405 U.S. at 188.
The facts involved in this case were somewhat unusual. While the confession clause in
Overmyer was bargained for between parties of substantially equal bargaining power, the
more typical use of confessions arises between parties with disparate bargaining power in
adhesion situations. This is especially true in the area of retail installment sales contracts
which favor merchant sellers over unwary low-income buyers who must rely upon installment
buying in making most of their major purchases. Comment, Abolition of the Confession of
Judgment Note in Retail Installment Sales Contracts in Pennsylvania, 73 DicK. L. Rzv. 115,
116 (1968-69). Generally, merchants possess knowledge of commerce sufficient to protect their
rights when entering into contractual relations. Consumers, on the other hand, lack not only
the knowledge but also the bargaining power and motivation needed to deal with merchants
on an equal level. Comment, Confession of Judgment Under a Warrant of Attorney, 6 AKRON
L. Rzv. 63, 74 (1973). The disparity of power inherent in most consumer debtor-creditor
situations was effectively explained in Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967):
That difference [in bargaining power] exists because generally there is a substantial inequality of economic resources. . ...Their greater economic resources permit
[the seller and his financer] to obtain the advice of experts; moreover, they have
more time to reflect about the specific terms of exchange prior to the negotiations
with the consumer; they know from experience how to strengthen their own position
. . .and [they are] better able to absorb the impact of a single imprudent or unfair
exchange.
Id. at 110, 232 A.2d at 410.
49. The parties also agreed to reduce the amount of the monthly installments, to extend
the final payment date by one year, to reduce the interest rate on the note from 6 1/2%
to 6%,
to release three mechanics liens filed against Overmyer's property and to execute a second
mortgage on Overmyer's property. 405 U.S. at 180.
50. Id. at 180-81. At the time it ceased its payments, Overmyer instituted a suit against
Frick in New York, asserting that Frick had breached the original contract. The New York
court granted an ex parte stay of all proceedings which Frick might institute against Overmyer, but the stay was vacated when Overmyer was unable to show that its cause had merit.
Id. at 181.
51. Id. at 184.
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the Court analogized the waiver of due process rights incorporated
in a confession clause to the waiver of fifth and sixth amendment
rights in criminal proceedings." The Court found that even if the
strict criminal standard of a voluntary, knowing and intelligent
waiver was applied, Overmyer had effectively waived its right to due
process. 3 The decision emphasized that Overmyer had been aware
of the presence of the confession clause and had been informed by
counsel of the clause's legal consequences. Furthermore, it stressed
that the clause resulted from arms-length negotiations between parties of equal bargaining power. 5'
The Overmyer Court severely limited the precedential value of its
decision by indicating that different factual circumstances would
require a contrary holding:
Our holding, of course, is not controlling precedent for other facts
of other cases. For example, where the contract is one of adhesion,
where there is great disparity in bargaining power, and where the
debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision, other legal con5
sequences may ensue.
Since the Court listed circumstances in the conjunctive rather than
the disjunctive, it is unclear whether the presence of one factor
alone, such as lack of consideration, will suffice to support a claim
that a waiver is invalid. Also, by failing to declare the list exclusive,
the Court has opened the door to the possibility that other factors
might warrant a holding different from Overmyer. Just how varied
the facts may be for a court to be able to distinguish the outcome
in Overmyer remains an enigma.56 Finally, a related issue not addressed by Overmyer continues unresolved. In Overmyer the Court
found that the facts clearly evidenced a valid waiver of due process
52. Id. at 185.
53. Id. at 185-86. The Court noted several leading criminal cases which had relied on this
standard including Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 94 (1972).
54. 405 U.S. at 186.
55. Id. at 188.
56. See Piercy v. Heyison, 565 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1977), where the court found facts
sufficiently different from those of Overmyer and vacated a summary judgment which had
relied on the outcome in the Overmyer case. The case involved a confession note signed
following an automobile accident in order to satisfy a subrogation claim. The court found that
Overmyer was distinguishable because: 1) there was unequal bargaining power between the
debtor, who was unable to pay a $228.00 judgment and the creditor insurance company, a
"financial giant"; 2) counsel was not present when the debtor signed the confession note; and
3) the sole consideration which the debtor received for signing the note was the promise of
the insurance company not to have the debtor's driver's license suspended as it could have
done under a Pennsylvania statute. However, this statute had been declared unconstitutional, rendering the consideration nugatory.
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rights. 7 However, the Court did not decide whether a hearing to
determine the validity of a waiver must precede the entry of a confessed judgment. 58
DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A WAIVER

Since rights guaranteed by the Constitution are fundamental to
the American legal process, there is a well settled presumption
against their waiver." However, it has been established that such a
waiver may be valid under certain circumstances. 0 Although
Overmyer declined to hold that the criminal standard of a knowing,
intelligent and voluntary waiver should be applied to confession
proceedings, lower federal and state courts have adopted this test
without comment.6" This result is consistent with the dictates of the
fourteenth amendment which do not differentiate between criminal
and civil matters in affording due process protection. 2 As the rights
relinquished in signing a confession note are by no means trivial,
due process safeguards would require at the very least that the
creditor clarify for the debtor the legal consequences of executing
the note. 4
One of the major controversies surrounding confessions of judgment is whether mere execution of a confession note will suffice to
show an effective waiver of rights. 5 Overmyer suggested that the
factual context surrounding the signing of the confession note is
determinative of its validity. Illinois courts have inferred from
Overmyer that there is no presumption against the validity of waivers embodied in confession clauses.
57. 405 U.S. 186-88.
58. See Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 971, aff'd
on remand, 359 F. Supp. 124, 127 (1972); Isbell v. County of Sonoma, Cal. 3d __,
577 P.2d 188, 195, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368, 375 (1978).
59. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942); Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272,
1274, 1277 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
60. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
61. See Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 971, aff'd
on remand, 359 F. Supp. 124, 127 (1972); Isbell v. County of Sonoma,
- Cal. 3d -.
577 P.2d 188, 190, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368, 370 (1978); Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 27 111. App.
3d 225, 229, 326 N.E.2d 542, 545 (1975).
62. Note, Cognovit Notes: Pretrial Waiver of ConstitutionalRights in Civil Cases, 51
N.C.L. REv. 554, 556-57 (1973).
63. See note 9 supra.
64. See Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 27 Ill. App. 3d 225, 229, 326 N.E.2d 542, 545 (1975)
citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Note, A Clash in Ohio? Cognovit Notes and the
Business Ethic of the UCC, 35 U. CIN. L. REv. 470, 494 (1966).
65. See Isbell v. County of Sonoma, __
Cal. 3d -,
, 577 P.2d 188, 192, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 368, 372 (1978).
66. 405 U.S. 174, 187-88 (1972).
67. See Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 27 Ill. App. 3d 225, 229, 326 N.E.2d 542, 545
(1975).
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Other jurisdictions have taken a different view of Overmyer and
declared that the existence of a valid waiver cannot be conditioned
solely on the execution of a confession note." Since the circumstances giving rise to the confession note usually cannot be discerned
from the face of the instrument, these courts have held that judgments predicated only upon these notes are defective." Such factors
as the debtor's legal sophistication," state of mind" and relative
bargaining power vis c vis the creditor 72 which may not be apparent
from the face of the instrument are relevant in determining the
validity of a waiver. Illinois, which lacks definitive guidelines for
determining the constitutional validity of confessed judgments,
should follow the lead of these other jurisdictions and establish
criteria which would afford greater protection to debtors.
THE REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE AND A HEARING A

ER JUDGMENT HAS

BEEN ENTERED BY CONFESSION

Illinois has taken the stance, based on Overmyer, that the signing
of a confession note will support a confessed judgment if the debtor
subsequently has an opportunity to challenge its validity. 73 Other
jurisdictions 74 have disagreed that hearings afforded after entry of a
judgment, even if held prior to execution, satisfy due process. These
courts have reasoned that such hearings do not conform to the requirement that the opportunity to be heard "be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,
7
yet be prevented.

'75

when deprivation may

In Illinois, the confession of judgment statute does not require77
that a debtor be notified of a judgment confessed against him.
68. See Virgin Islands Nat'l Bank v. Tropical Ventures, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1203, 1206
(D.V.I. 1973); Isbell v. County of Sonoma, Cal. 3d _
577 P.2d 188, 145 Cal. Rptr.
368 (1978).
69. Cal. 3d at , Virgin Islands Nat'l Bank v. Tropical Ventures, Inc., 358 F.
Supp. 1203 (D.V.I. 1973).
70. Cal. 3d at __, 577 P.2d at 193, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
71. Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272, 1278 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Virgin Islands Nat'l Bank
v. Tropical Ventures, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1203, 1207 (D.V.I. 1973).
72. Cal. 3d at , 577 P.2d at 193, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
73. See Star Finance Corp. v. McGee, 27 Ill. App. 3d 421, 425, 326 N.E.2d 518, 522 (1975).
74. See Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 971, aff'd
on remand, 359 F. Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1972); Virgin Islands Nat'l Bank v. Tropical Ventures,
Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1203 (D.V.I. 1973); Isbell v. County of Sonoma,__ Cal. 3d _ 577 P.2d
188, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1978).
75. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965).
76. 407 U.S. at 81.
77. Other states with confession statutes similar to that of Illinois do have the notice
requirement. OHIO REy. CoDE ANN. § 2323.13 (Page Cum. Supp. 1978); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
236 (Purdon Supp. 1978).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 10

Supreme Court Rule 276,18 which provides for the opening of a confessed judgment, does not remedy this situation, for a debtor cannot
contest a judgment of which he is unaware. Although technically the
mere entry of a judgment will not result in a deprivation of property,
if a creditor obtains a judgment lien, the debtor's right to use, sell
and collateralize his property is seriously impaired." Even if the
debtor is later permitted to open the judgment and prevails on the
merits, he may already have been harmed by entry of the confessed
judgment. 0
In a related context, the federal court decision in Scott v.
Danaherelupheld a constitutional attack on the Illinois garnishment
statute when used to satisfy a confessed judgment. The basis for the
decision was the failure of the statute to require notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to execution on the judgment. The plaintiffs in the action signed an installment sales contract and judgment
note containing a confession clause in order to purchase a vacuum
cleaner. When the plaintiffs ceased paying on the note, judgment
was confessed by defendant Puritan Thrift Plan, Inc., which had
subsequently obtained possession of the paper." Based on the confessed judgment, Puritan Thrift requested that the court clerk
issue a non-wage garnishment summons8 3 against the plaintiffs'
bank. The plaintiffs remained unaware of the judgment and garnishment proceedings until notified by their bank that funds on
8
deposit has been frozen. '
The court held that the rights to due process had been violated
because the garnishment statute failed to provide for a method of
determining whether the debtors had "knowingly and voluntarily"
waived their rights to notice and a hearing prior to the issuance of
the garnishment summons.8 5 The Illinois legislature has not responded to this decision. The Circuit Court of Cook County, how78. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 276 (1977). See note 28 supra.
79. Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349, 1356 (D. Del. 1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 971
(1972), aff'd on remand, 359 F. Supp. 124 (1972).
80. See Tunheim v. Bowman, 366 F. Supp. 1392, 1393 (D. Nev. 1973) where the court
upheld the validity of Nevada confessed judgments in light of Overmyer. The court noted
that the only difference between the Ohio procedure involved in Overmyer and that of Nevada
was that Ohio required prompt notice of the entry of judgment to the debtor. This difference
because by that time the harm has been done."
was characterized as "insubstantial ...
81. 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
82. Apparently the seller of the vacuum cleaner had discounted the paper to Puritan
Thrift.
83. Garnishment of wages is the one area where Illinois law prohibits confession of judgment without service of process. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 62, § 82 (1977).
84. 343 F. Supp. at 1274.
85. Id.
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ever, has acknowledged the Scott holding by promulgating General
Order 6.4(b), providing that the court clerk must refuse to issue a
garnishment summons based on a confessed judgment unless the
judgment has been confirmed by service of process."s Thus, where
non-wage garnishment is involved, the right to notice and a hearing prior to execution of a confessed judgment is supported only
by judicial fiat and not by legislative mandate. Since the right to
notice and a hearing is required where a confessed judgment is followed by garnishment, logic would dictate that the same rights be
granted before any type of execution on a confessed judgment.
should act to conform their
Both the Illinois courts and legislature
7
Scott.
to
statutes
and
decisions
THE BURDEN OF PROOF

Since most jurisdictions accept a signed confession note as prima
facie evidence of the creditor's claim, the debtor must shoulder the
burden of proof in contesting a confessed judgment.88 The Illinois
86. See Supplement to Historical and Practice Notes, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 50(3)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978). The clerk of the court must refuse to issue a garnishment summons
based on a confessed judgment unless the judgment has been confirmed by service of process.
No time limit is established within which this summons to confirm judgment must be served.
Nor does this General Order apply anywhere other than Cook County. Id. The only further
change has been the addition of General Order 6.4(c), promulgated in 1973, which forbids
the clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County from issuing citations to discover assets, rules
to show cause and warrants for arrests based on judgments by confession unless these, too,
have been confirmed by service of process.
87. Tangentially related to the question of when a hearing should be held in a confession
of judgment proceeding are a series of Supreme Court cases decided within the past ten years
which dealt with various summary creditor's rights. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. DiChem Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). With
the exception of Mitchell, the Court struck down statutes which permitted summary seizures
without affording prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. In Mitchell, the Louisiana
sequestration statute was upheld because the entire process was judicially controlled, the
grounds for the writ had to be verified, the debtor was given an immediate right to challenge
and bond had to be posted to protect the prevailing party. McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in Procedure and Substance-Repossession and
Adhesion ContractIssues, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 383, 393-94 (1974). Although the judicial policies
reflected in these decisions have not been extended to the confession procedure, (See Note,
Cognovit Revisited: Due Process and Confession of Judgment, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1045, 1064
(1973); Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 27 Ill. App. 3d 225, 229, 326 N.E.2d 542, 544 (1975)),
they are not inapposite since the same due process rights are involved.
In Di-Chem the Court declared that no distinction should be made between different types
of property when due process is at issue. 419 U.S. at 723. This decision casts doubt on the
Illinois confession procedure which requires due process when garnishment of wages is involved but which declines to afford that protection to other property.
88. See Virgin Islands Nat'l Bank v. Tropical Ventures, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1203 (D.V.I.
1973) where the court stated that at a pre-judgment hearing to determine the validity of a
waiver, the debtor's signature on a confession note would constitute prima facie evidence of
a valid waiver. However, the court indicated that the debtor need only allege a lack of
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procedure for opening a confessed judgment exemplifies the problems which face a debtor carrying the burden of proof. Under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 276,9 the onus is on the debtor to convince the
court that he has a meritorious defense if he is to succeed in opening
the confessed judgment. The debtor must also overcome the presumption which favors the regularity of a judgment.90 This task
becomes more difficult when his claim is predicated upon invalidity
of the waiver of due process rights, since he must prove a negative
proposition rather than an affirmative one.9
Proving the existence of a valid claim is by no means the only
obstacle which the debtor must overcome to prevail. The debtor
must first be able to pay the expenses involved in opening a confessed judgment, such as court costs and attorney's fees. Having
recently defaulted on the obligation leading to the confessed judgment, it is unlikely that the debtor will be financially able to take
advantage of the procedures provided by Illinois law for attacking
the judgment.92
Isbell v. County of Sonoma: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ILLINOIS
The recent California Supreme Court decision in Isbell v. County
of Sonoma93 may have important implications for confessions of
judgment in Illinois. In Isbell, the court struck down the California
confession of judgment statute, 4 holding that it violated due process
understanding to meet the burden, an allegation which the creditor must rebut to prevail.
Id. at 1207. See Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970) aff'd on other grounds,
405 U.S. 191 (1972), where the court objected to the Pennsylvania procedure which placed
the burden of proof on the debtor seeking post-judgment relief similar to that provided for
under Illinois law. The court noted that:
[T]he burden of proof is placed upon the debtor who is considered the proponent
of a claim and who must convince the court of the need for equitable relief ...
The placing of this burden upon the debtor is in direct contrast to the burdens in a
normal or pre-judgment creditor-debtor action. In those cases instituted by a creditor . . . the creditor is considered the proponent of a claim and the burdens are
his.
Id. at 1094-95. The Virgin Islands court rejected this contention. 358 F. Supp. at 1207.
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 276 (1977). See note 28 supra.
90. Economy Truck Sales & Service, Inc. v. Granger, 61 111. App. 2d 111, 209 N.E.2d 1
(1965). However, this case seems to ignore the presumption that exists against a valid waiver
of rights. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
91. Note, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L.R. 624, 631 (1974), citing Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp.
1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
92. See 314 F. Supp. at 1094. The federal court construed the Pennsylvania procedure
used to open a confessed judgment. The procedure is similar to that found in Illinois; Comment, Abolition of the Confession of Judgment Note in Retail Installment Sales Contracts
in Pennsylvania, 73 DICK. L. Ray. 115, 120 (1968-69); Comment, A Clash in Ohio?: Cognovit
Notes and the Business Ethic of the UCC, 35 U. CiN. L. REv. 470, 481-82 (1966).
93. Cal. 3d , 577 P.2d 188, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1978).
94. Id. at -,
577 P.2d at 194, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 374.

19781

Confessions of Judgment

by providing for neither prejudgment judicial determination of the
validity of a waiver nor adequate post-judgment relief. 5 Although
the California confession procedure differs from that in Illinois,9" the
issue of waiver is the same in both jurisdictions.
The plaintiffs in Isbell were California welfare recipients. Plaintiff
Isbell was jailed after pleading guilty to welfare fraud. As the court
had not ordered restitution, a county representative visited the
plaintiff in jail and convinced her to sign a confession of judgment
for the overpayment. Entry of judgment ensued and when the plaintiff later purchased a home the judgment became a lien on her
property. 7 The other two plaintiffs were accused of fraudulently
obtaining an excessive amount of welfare funds, but no charges were
brought against them. Nevertheless, at the behest of a county representative, they also executed a confession of judgment. Judgment
was rendered and the county subsequently attempted to enforce it."5
The court held that mere presentation of a signed confession note
is insufficient to demonstrate a valid waiver of due process rights.
In so holding, the court rejected the contention that the execution
of a confession note alone establishes that a waiver has been knowingly and intelligently made.100 The court took what was tantamount to judicial notice of the fact that "confessions of judgment
are most frequently employed against those who are unaware of the
significance of that procedure". 01 The court concluded that since
the use of confessed judgments was so prone to "overreaching, deception and abuse" a signed confession agreement could not possi95. Id. at
_,
-, 577 P.2d at 190, 194, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 370, 374.
96. The most important difference is that California prohibits the use of a warrant of
attorney. The defendant must confess his own judgment in writing. The confession is generally filed with a court clerk who enters the judgment. See Cal. 3d at __,
577 P.2d at
191, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
97. Id. at __,
577 P.2d at 190, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
98. Id.
99. In so deciding, the court observed:
[Elven if the terms of the confession are not dictated by the creditor, the drastic
nature of the device . . . even the right to be notified of the existence of the
proceeding - strongly suggests a substantial disparity in bargaining position and
implies overreaching on the part of the creditor.
Id. at __, 577 P.2d at 193, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
100. Id.
101. Id. To support this contention, the majority relied on Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp.
1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), af'd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972), which in turn had relied on a single study
conducted in Philadelphia. The only other source noted by the court was a general survey of
the use of cognovits by finance companies in 1961. The dissenting opinion criticized the court
for dealing in generalities. Cal. 3d at , 577 P.2d at 198, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 378
(Richardson, J., dissenting).
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bly be accepted as prima facie evidence of a knowing and intelligent
waiver. 102
After determining that the California pre-judgment confession
procedure was constitutionally unacceptable, the court examined
whether post-judgment relief could cure the defects inherent in the
confession process. 0 3 It determined that a hearing on the validity of
a waiver is ineffectual if held after judgment has been entered. 0' As
the court noted:
Once judgment has entered, the damage is done; the debtor is now
subject to an obligation imposed in violation of his due process
rights, and the creditor can immediately employ legal process to
enforce that obligation. 5
The Isbell decision specifically rejected the reasoning espoused in
the Illinois case of Scott v. Danaher,0 1 where the court found no
violation of due process as long as the debtor was given notice and
a hearing prior to execution on the judgment.
The Isbell court then disposed of the contention that D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co. was binding precedent. 07 The court observed
that the Ohio statute involved in Overmyer provided the debtor
with several procedural and substantive safeguards 0 8 which the California statutes lacked. Notable among these was the requirement
that notice be given to the debtor of the entry of a judgment confessed against him. 09 In addition, the court found that Overmyer
did not address the constitutionality of the Ohio confession procedures but instead relied on the peculiar facts of the case in upholding the validity of the waiver." 0 Therefore, Overmyer was not determinative as to whether a pre-judgment hearing to ascertain the
validity of a waiver is necessary for a confessed judgment to comport
with due process."'
Isbell not only elucidates the infirmities in present Illinois confession law, but also exemplifies a method by which the Illinois confession procedures could be attacked without running afoul of
102.
103.

Id. at
Id. at

__,

., 577 P.2d at 192-93, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73.
577 P.2d at 194, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 374.

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at n.6, 577 P.2d at 194 n.6, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 374 n.6. See text accompanying
notes 81 through 87 supra.
107.

Cal. 3d at

-

__,

577 P.2d at 195, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 375.

108. Id.
109. Like California, Illinois law makes no provision for notice to the debtor when a
confessed judgment is entered.
110.

-

111.

Id.

Cal. 3d at

__,

577 P.2d at 195, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
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Overmyer. Illinois should reassess the constitutionality of its own
confession of judgment law in light of the Isbell decision.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE: THE LEGISLATIVE IMPERATIVE

It has been said that "longevity can, by no means, be equated
with constitutionality.""' 2 Neither should it be equated with good
law. Although confessed judgments have survived for centuries and
weathered continual attacks, the burgeoning law of debtors' rights
indicates a new concern for guaranteeing due process to the consumer." 3 In the area of confessed judgments, even the United States
Supreme Court has expressed its discomfiture with the state of present law."' Court decisions, however, have been an ineffective means
of challenging the current confession of judgment procedure. Two
reasons for this result may be hypothesized. The first is that few
confessed judgments are appealed due to the expense involved."'
Class action suits have proven unsuccessful in surmounting this
handicap since they have caused the courts to shift their focus from
the confession procedure to the appropriateness of having the
plaintiff-debtor(s) represent the class." 6 As the tendency of the
courts has been to refuse to maintain confession suits as class actions," 7 only named plaintiffs benefit from such decisions. Where
courts elect to restrict class membership,"' debtors are faced with
the difficulty of proving that they belong to the delineated class. " ,
The second and more important explanation for the failure of the
courts to redress the inequities inherent in the confession procedure
is their avowed reluctance to become enmeshed in an area which is
rightly within the province of the legislature. Restrictions on the use
of confessed judgments in virtually all jurisdictions are prescribed
112. Comment, Abolition of the Confession of Judgment Note in Retail Installment Sales
Contracts in Pennsylvania, 73 DIcK. L. Rav. 115, 118 (1968-69).
113. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox,
405 U.S. 191 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
114. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 202 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S.
174, 188 (1972).
115. See text accompanying note 92 supra; 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 741, 747 (1972).
116. See, e.g., Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 191
(1972); Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 27 Ill. App. 3d 225, 326 N.E.2d 542 (1975). In Irmco,
the court noted that the defendant did not charge that his own waiver of due process was
invalid but instead only contended that the waiver given by "typical consumers" could not
possibly be effective. Id. at 229, 326 N.E.2d at 545.
117. See Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 971
(1972); Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 27 Ill. App. 3d 225, 326 N.E.2d 542 (1975).
118. See Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
119. See 314 F. Supp. at 1099; 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 741, 747 (1972).
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by laws which the various state legislatures have enacted.'20 A recent
Illinois decision acknowledged that the courts are waiting for the
Illinois legislature to do likewise. Ives v. May'2' involved an attack
on the right of a creditor to confess judgment prior to default as
authorized by the confession clause in question. In upholding the
validity of the pre-default clause, the court announced that the
debtors' arguments "would be more properly directed to the Illinois
legislature rather than to this court."' 22 Moreover, the United States
Supreme Court has stated that "[p]roblems of this kind
[regarding confessions of judgment] are peculiarly appropriate
grist for the legislative mill."'2 3 Clearly, it is up to the legislature to
either abolish or curtail the use of confessed judgments in Illinois.
PROPOSED AREAS OF CHANGE

As total abolition of confessed judgments in Illinois appears unlikely, a new statute should be promulgated to abrogate the common law and delimit the procedural bounds as well as the circumstances in which creditors could utilize confessed judgments.
In order to protect the class of people usually victimized by confession clauses, the statute should prohibit the use of these clauses
in such areas as consumer sales, small loans and home solicitation
contracts.'25 Furthermore, to insure procedural due process to all
persons who might become subject to confession clauses, warrants
of attorney should be abolished and creditors precluded from obtaining confessed judgments against debtors prior to default on their
underlying obligations.
The proposed statute should also require that notice be sent to the
debtor immediately upon entry of the confessed judgment. 26 Execu120. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
121. 5 Il1. App. 3d 193, 282 N.E.2d 193 (1972).
122. Id. at 196, 282 N.E.2d at 195.
123. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 202 (1972); See 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L.R. 624, 636
(1974).
124. The lack of restrictions under the current Illinois confession law has led to the
continuation of common law practices, which need to be eliminated if a new statute is to
operate successfully in protecting debtors' rights.
125. These areas are representative of the restrictions found in other states. See note 7
supra. They are the most likely to involve individuals who are unaware of the legal ramifications of confession clauses, who are most susceptible to abuse by creditors and who are either
ignorant of the availability of post-judgment relief or are unable to afford it. See Time,
February 28, 1977 at 36, 40.
126. In Cook County, Illinois, (which includes Chicago) a summons to confirm a confessed
judgment is usually sent as a matter of form. Some judges will not permit execution on a
confessed judgment unless the debtor has received such a notice. It is important, however,
that this notice requirement be embodied in a statute and not left to the discretion of the
court or the creditor.
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tion on such a judgment should be stayed pending compliance with
this provision. The notice should be accompanied by a copy of the
complaint and the confession, in order to inform the debtor of the
nature of the judgment. After receiving notice, the debtor should be
217
assured adequate time to attack the judgment prior to execution.
Even if the proposed statute incorporates all of the protective
measures previously mentioned, a hearing to determine the validity
of the waivers embodied in the confession clause should be made a
mandatory prerequisite to the entry of a confessed judgment. The
hearing will not place an impossible burden on the creditor. In the
majority of cases where the debtor has no defense, he is unlikely to
hire an attorney and contest the matter. 28 If the validity of the
waiver is contested, the hearing on that issue need not incorporate
29
all the features of a trial.
At the waiver hearing, the creditor should bear the burden of
proving that the debtor's relinquishment of his due process rights
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. A requirement that confession of judgment clauses be written in a manner comprehensible to
a layman, conveying to him the seriousness of the legal consequences involved, would not only enlighten the debtor but would
also aid the creditor in carrying his burden of proof. 30 In mandating
that the creditor prove the existence of a valid waiver, the statute
will compel the creditor to call the confession clause to the debtor's
attention in order to later assert that the waiver had been knowingly
made. The requirement that the confession clause be phrased in
lucid language will also aid the creditor in that it will lend support
to the claim that the waiver had been intelligently executed. Therefore, the only major obstacle confronting the creditor will be the
burden of proving that execution had been voluntary and not the
result of unequal bargaining power or overreaching on his part. 3 '
127. See, e.g., Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 191
(1972), where the District Court found the 20 day notice provision prior to execution of a
confessed judgment insufficient, as a debtor who lacked the financial means to pay his debt
would not have enough time to hire an attorney to open the judgment.
128. Virgin Islands Nat'l Bank v. Tropical Ventures, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1203, 1208 (D. V.I.
1973); Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit, 29 U. CH. L. REv. 111, 142 (1961). This conclusion is even stronger where an out-ofstate debtor is involved.
129. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 26667 (1970).
130. See, e.g., Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Ill. 1972), where the court
examined the difficulties which a layman would have in recognizing the true dimensions of
the confession provision in question.
131. See, e.g., OHIO Rxv. CODE ANN. § 2323.13(D) (Page Cum. Supp. 1978), which requires
the following warning in confession notes:
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CONCLUSION

The confession of judgment procedure in Illinois should either be
abolished or amended so that Illinois citizens will receive the due
process protection to which they are entitled under the Constitution. The ease with which the present system permits an unwary
debtor to waive these rights is unjustified and serves no vital state
interest. Creditors would not be harmed by the abolition of confessed judgments as they can rely on other established methods
33
of protecting their rights.'
Although confession provisions have not been declared unconstitutional per se, their validity in contexts other than Overmyer remains suspect. If confessions of judgment are to continue to be
sanctioned, justice demands that a pre-judgment waiver hearing be
held in which the creditor has the burden of proving that the confession note was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily executed.
Furthermore, notice should be given after the entry of the confessed
judgment and an adequate opportunity should be allowed the
debtor to contest it. Finally, confession clauses should be banned
from transactions in which unsuspecting consumers are most likely
to be harmed. It is up to the Illinois legislature to bring the Illinois
confession of judgment procedure in line with twentieth century
concepts of due process.
CINDY

F.

WILE

Warning-By signing this paper you give up your right to notice and court trial. If
you do not pay on time a court judgment may be taken against you without your
prior knowledge and the powers of the court can be used to collect from you regardless of any claims you may have against the creditor whether for returned goods,
failure on his part to comply with his agreement, or any other cause.
132. Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349, 1355 (D. Del. 1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 971
(1972); 75 DICK. L. REv. 169, 177 (1970).
133. Promissory notes, for example, may be substituted for the use of confession notes.
Comment, Confessions of Judgment, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 524, 524 (1954). If a debtor chooses
not to defend in a suit where he has been served with process, a default judgment may be
entered against him. The default judgment is advantageous to the creditor as it becomes final
in 30 days. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 50(5) (1977). No appreciable loss of time or money results
when a creditor obtains a default judgment as opposed to a confessed judgment. Horwitz,
Confession of Judgment Clauses as Violating Federal Truth-In-Lending Where Creditors
Have Waived Their Right to Have Liens Placed on Obligors' Residences, 66 ILL. B.J. 688,
694 (1978). Horwitz notes that if creditors were to cease relying upon confession clauses, they
would avoid possible conflicts with the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (commonly
known as Federal Truth-in-Lending). Id. at 688-93.
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